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The Duty to Obey and the Right to Fight1 
 
 
 
Just war theory is currently dominated by two positions. The standard position, reflecting 
current international law and formulated in the classic work of Michael Walzer, is that 
combatants both on the just and the unjust side have the same moral status (i.e. the same 
moral rights, duties, immunities and liabilities). According to this view, provided that jus 
in bello principles2 are respected, all combatants have an equal right to fight, which is not 
affected by the justice of the cause pursued by their state.3 The most uncontroversial 
justification for the right to kill is our right to act in defence, and combatants retain this 
right, independently of the side for which they fight.4 
This view has recently been challenged by many, but most notably by Jeff 
McMahan.5 The main objection raised by these critics is that the alleged “moral equality 
of combatants” relies on a fallacious idea, namely the presumed symmetry between 
parties who find themselves in the position of having to defend themselves against each 
other’s use of force. This symmetry, McMahan argues, cannot be correct. How could 
Andy and Ben have the same right to kill each other in self-defence if Andy has 
unjustifiably attacked Ben, while Ben is in a position of having to kill Andy simply 
because this is the only way in which he can survive the unjust attack? Posing a threat of 
                                                
1 Thanks to audiences at the Institute for Advanced Studies of Hebrew University as well as at the 
Universities of Miami, Arizona, Pavia, York and Oxford for stimulating discussions. Special thanks are 
owed to Saba Bazargan, Tom Christiano, Seth Lazar, Jeff McMahan and Annie Stiltz for illuminating 
comments.  
2 Jus in bello principles concern the justice of conduct within war. They establish, for example, which types 
of weapons may be used, who can be targeted, and under which circumstances certain amounts of force 
may be used. These principles are contrasted with jus ad bellum principles, i.e. the principles that establish 
whether a party has a just cause for war. 
3 Just and Unjust Wars, p. 34-41 
4 This is what explains why, according to the traditional view, combatants are liable to harm, whereas non- 
combatants are not (the so called “principle of discrimination”). The former but not the latter threaten 
others with harm.  
5 McMahan, Killing in War (KIW). See also Coady, Fabre, McPherson, Frowe, Rodin.  
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harm cannot be sufficient to become liable to be killed, McMahan concludes. It is only 
when the threat is unjustified that liability to be killed in self-defence is triggered.  
Once this idea is accepted – and it is hard to see how it could be rejected – the 
rejection of the moral equality of combatants seems to follow. It is not true anymore that, 
as long as jus in bello principles are respected, all combatants have “an equal right to 
kill,” independently from the justice of the cause for which they are fighting. Only 
combatants who fight for a just cause have such right. For the same reasons that Andy 
does not have a right to act in self-defence against Ben, combatants fighting on the unjust 
side, do not have a right to defend themselves against the use of force by combatants on 
the just side. The justice of the cause makes a difference as to whether combatants can 
permissibly fight.  
Thus, contrary to the traditional view, combatants are not morally permitted to 
take part in any war they are required to fight as long as they respect the requirements of 
jus in bello. Combatants must take responsibility for their actions and investigate whether 
the war they are required to fight is indeed just. Only if it is, do they acquire a right to 
kill.  
This means that when combatants have reason to believe that the war they are 
ordered to fight is unjust, their duty is to disobey. Moreover, when they lack sufficient 
reason to believe that the war is unjust, but also to believe that the war is just, combatants 
should presume that their duty is not to fight. This is partly because statistically it will be 
more likely that the war they are asked to fight is unjust;6 partly because in fighting they 
risk contributing to the killing of innocents, and their duty not to contribute to the killing 
of the innocent is stronger than their duty to contribute to achieving whatever aim is 
pursued by the war (including the aim of preventing innocents from being killed).7 For 
these reasons, we should conclude that “in conditions of uncertainty, the moral 
presumption is against fighting”.8 
I believe that both Walzer’s view and McMahan’s view capture important aspects 
of the correct way to think about the morality of war. McMahan is right in pointing out 
that the justice of the cause plays a fundamental role in determining whether combatants 
have a right to fight;9 but he seems to lose sight of the fact that combatants act as 
members of a political body, and that this has important normative implications with 
                                                
6 KIW, p. 143-5. 
7 Following McMahan, I use the term “innocents” to refer to those who have done nothing to make 
themselves morally liable to military attack (KIW, p. 8). 
8 KIW, p. 144. 
9 Unless otherwise specified, I will assume throughout the paper that wars always have a just and an unjust 
side, i.e. that one side meets the requirement of jus ad bellum (usually a state defending itself or a state 
involved in humanitarian intervention) and one doesn’t (typically, an aggressing state). Of course things are 
normally more complicated than that: it is rarely the case that one party is completely right and one 
completely wrong. But for ease of exposition I will leave this complication aside in the paper. I will also 
bracket the problem of unjust wars that can be justified as lesser evils. The reader should assume that in 
talking of unjust wars (i.e. wars that lack a just cause) I refer to wars that also lack a lesser evil justification.  
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respect to the rights and duties they have. These rights and duties also make a difference 
as to whether they can permissibly fight, but receive insufficient attention in his theory.  
Walzer’s view, by contrast, is sensitive to these aspects, as it is precisely by 
appealing to the idea that combatants are bound by ties of loyalty and political obedience 
to their state that he explains why they should not be expected to question the justice of 
the wars they are asked to fight.10 His view however, is inadequate in that it overstates the 
force of these considerations and completely disregards the importance of the just cause. 
While Walzer is certainly right in acknowledging that combatants normally operate 
within a structure of political responsibilities, this is not enough to conclude, as he does, 
that their will is never engaged in deciding whether to fight, but only in deciding how to 
fight. Saying that Rommel should not be considered a “willful wrongdoer, but a loyal and 
obedient subject and citizen” and that his obedience to Hitler wipes the crime from his 
hands11 is implausible for the reasons that McMahan has so powerfully articulated in his 
work.    
Thus, it looks as if the correct account of the morality of war will have to strike a 
middle path between these two views: it will have to acknowledge the relevance of the 
just cause in establishing whether combatants possess a right to fight, while paying 
attention at the same time to the normative implications of the fact that combatants 
typically act as members of political bodies. These are the two desiderata that a plausible 
account will have to meet in order to overcome the problems that afflict Walzer’s and 
McMahan’s view respectively. Providing such an account is the aim of this paper.  
I will argue that when members of a legitimate state are ordered to fight they are 
placed under a prima facie obligation to obey.12 This obligation does not depend for its 
validity on the justice of the cause being pursued. However, when the war is unjust, this 
obligation is likely to be overridden by a weightier obligation, namely the obligation not 
to contribute to the killing of innocents. Moreover, I will argue that combatants do have 
duty to do all they can to find out whether the war they are ordered to fight is unjust. As it 
will become clear, this view captures the insights of both Walzer’s and McMahan’s 
views, while avoiding at the same time the problems that afflict each of them.  
I will proceed in four steps. I will start by considering two recent attempts to resist 
McMahan’s challenge to the orthodox view by looking at the duties that combatants have 
qua members of political communities (sections 2 and 3). I call this “the political 
argument for the right to fight”.13 Since my aim in this paper is to defend a version of this 
argument, it will be helpful to consider the shortcomings of these two earlier views. I 
then introduce my own version of the political argument by addressing a powerful 
                                                
10 Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 39-40. 
11 Just and Unjust Wars, p. 39. 
12 In this paper I will use “duty” and “obligation” interchangeably. Also, given its currency I will use the 
expression “prima facie obligation”, instead of “pro-tanto obligation” (which some consider more 
accurate). 
13 For another interesting formulation of the “political argument”, see Christopher Kutz, “The Difference 
Uniforms Make”, PPA. For reasons of space, I will not consider this view here. 
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objection that McMahan has raised against it (section 4). In answering McMahan’s 
objection I articulate a justification for the existence a prima facie duty to obey the order 
to fight, independently from the justice of the war at hand. The nature of this duty is then 
further clarified in sections 5 and 6, where I explain how the prima facie nature of this 
duty is to be understood in terms of the existence of “presumptive reasons” to obey the 
law. I conclude in section 7 by highlighting some of the strengths of my view.  
 
 
2) David Estlund and the epistemic function of democracy 
 
The first version of the political argument that I will consider is the one defended by 
David Estlund in his paper “On Following Orders in an Unjust War”. Estlund argues that 
combatants have a duty to obey the order to fight an unjust war when the order comes 
from a democratic state which is “duly looking after the question whether the war is just” 
(p. 213). Combatants have a duty to ascertain that this condition is in place, but once they 
do, they must obey the order to fight and their “participation… is sanitized because [they 
are] following orders” (p. 213). When this is case, “even though the victim is wronged by 
the unjustly warring side, the soldier on that side is nevertheless morally obligated (and 
so morally permitted) to follow all normally binding orders – those that would be binding 
at least if the war were just” (p. 215).  
What this view has in common with McMahan’s approach is the idea that the 
right to fight is not merely conditional on jus in bello principles being respected. When 
combatants receive the order to fight, they should critically assess such order. Although 
combatants are not required to investigate the justice of the war (contra McMahan), they 
are required to check that their state is making an honest attempt to find out whether the 
war is just. Only in this case do they have a duty to obey the order.  
What the theory has in common with Walzer’s view is the idea that, once it is 
clear that this condition is in place, combatants don’t need to worry about whether the 
war is in fact just. They acquire a right to fight simply because they have a moral duty to 
obey the order received. Thus, as long as combatants know that their state has made an 
honest attempt to respect jus ad bellum principles, their “participation in an unjust war is 
sanitized … because [they were] following orders” (p. 213).14 
                                                
14 Estlund is ambiguous about the nature of the “honest mistake standard”. At times he suggests that the 
standard is met when a given political institution has in fact paid due consideration to the justice of the war 
at hand (pp. 213, 222); at times he suggests the standard is met when that institution normally has a certain 
epistemic value. (For example, on p. 232 he writes that a “political system meets the honest mistake 
standard … [when ] it is a process in which public debate and electoral discipline give the process an 
adequate and generally recognizable epistemic value, that is, a tendency … to go to war only justly”). If 
understood in the latter way, the standard seems too weak. For the fact that that a political system normally 
has a certain epistemic value does not give us reasons to obey if we know that this time it has made no 
effort to identify the correct course of action. We could imagine, for example, that a generally reliable 
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Estlund defends this view by appealing to two ideas. The first is the thought that 
democratic political institutions perform an important epistemic function, in that they 
tend to track morally correct courses of action. Commands issued by democratic political 
institutions tend to “get things right”, and thus will require their citizens to act in certain 
ways only when acting in those ways is morally mandatory (or at least morally 
permissible).15 Of course saying that democratic political institutions tend to get things 
right is not saying that they always get things right. Inevitably there will be cases in 
which the decision taken following the procedures of democratic institutions will not 
track the morally correct outcome. And to make things worse, independently from 
whether in a given case a certain procedure has in fact tracked the morally correct 
decision, people are likely to reasonably disagree as to whether it did. But since 
democratically taken decisions tend to be more reliable than our individual judgment, and 
we are normally not in a position to determine when they aren’t, we have reasons to defer 
to them even when they conflict with our judgment. 
The second idea invoked by Estlund in support of his view is what I will call the 
“public acceptability principle”: an important feature of democratic institutions is that 
even when individuals reasonably disagree over a certain moral issue, there is a sense in 
which the outcome of a democratic procedure is acceptable to all of them, for the 
procedure through which the issue is decided is one that can be defended to all those 
subject to it.16 To use Estlund’s case, we can reasonably disagree as to whether someone 
has committed a certain crime, despite the fact that we are equally competent and we 
have had access to the same evidence. Still, trial by jury is a procedure that can be 
defended to all of us as the best way to find out whether someone is guilty or innocent. 
This is why jailors and executioners are not permitted to follow their private judgment 
and let prisoners go free, provided that the latter have received a fair trial, even if a) 
jailors believe that the prisoners are innocent, and b) their belief is correct. Following 
their private judgment and letting the prisoner escape would be “implicitly making a 
claim to moral expertise that jailors (and executioners) could not justify to all reasonable 
points of view”.17 
For the same reason, combatants have a duty to obey the command to fight a 
certain war, provided that the decision to go to war has been taken democratically, even if 
a) they believe that the war is unjust (and therefore they will be killing innocents), and b) 
their belief is correct. In disobeying, a combatant would be claiming for himself a moral 
expertise that could not be justified to his fellow citizens, thereby placing himself above 
the results of the democratic process. As Estlund puts it, “[t]he justice of the war is being 
duly looked after by his nation, and that nation is entitled to have its will done … even 
                                                                                                                                            
political system occasionally wages war for the wrong reasons. When this is the case, it is hard to believe 
that we should regard the commands to fight as binding. I address this problem more extensively below, p. 
15 Estlund defends this view at length in his book Democratic Authority, 2008. 
16 This idea comes from Rawls, Political Liberalism. 
17 Lefkowitz, p. 223 
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when it is making a mistake” (p. 232). “The soldier would be wrong to substitute his own 
private verdict and twhart the state’s will” (p. 213). 
At first sight there might seem to be a tension between these two ideas. The 
epistemic justification is one that naturally fits an instrumental reading of democracy: we 
have a duty to obey the order to fight or to execute convicted prisoners because these are 
the outcomes of democratic procedures, and the outcomes of democratic procedures are 
likely to track morally correct choices. According to this view, although the existence of 
our duty to obey does not depend directly on the action commanded being correct, it does 
depend on the epistemic virtues of the procedure that dictates that action. The public 
acceptability principle, on the other hand, is one that naturally fits a reading of democracy 
as having non-instrumental value. According to this view, obeying the outcomes of the 
democratic process is the only way for me to treat my fellow citizens as free and equals. 
Disobeying, by contrast, is a way of imposing my will on them, instead of acting within 
the boundaries of those reasons that they could accept.  
The apparent tension, however, disappears, once we pay attention to the structure 
of Estlund’s view. The function of the public acceptability requirement is to exclude at 
the outset any procedure that cannot be publicly justified to everyone, including 
procedures in which experts are allowed to autonomously decide what to do. Democracy 
is then selected as the epistemically best among the remaining acceptable procedures. 
This is why epistemically good but publicly unacceptable procedures, such as those that 
would give jailors the right to let innocents go free or soldiers the right not to fight unjust 
wars, can never be allowed. 
Estlund’s view is sophisticated and provides an admirably nuanced account of the 
justification for our duty to obey democratic decisions. Doubts about its cogency, 
however, rise once we pay attention to two important concessions that he makes in 
discussing his jailer case.  To begin with, Estlund grants that in the exceptional case in 
which a jailer has first-hand knowledge of the innocence of the prisoner she is guarding, 
she does not have a duty to keep the prisoner in jail, even if the sentence has been 
inflicted after evidence of her first-hand knowledge has been considered by the jury. This 
seems at odds with the  claim that it’s wrong to act on our own judgment of what is right, 
when doing so goes against democratically taken decisions. After all, in the case of first-
hand knowledge too would the jailer be “substituting his own private verdict and thwart 
the state’s will” in letting the prisoner go free. He would be claiming for herself the right 
to disrespect the result of the trial by jury which, ex hypothesis, is the only procedure that 
can be defended to all of us as the best way to decide who is innocent in the face of 
reasonable disagreement. If Estlund believes that in this case the jailer should nonetheless 
let the prisoner go free, this must be because there are cases in which getting the right 
result is more important than respecting the limits of public justification. 
But if so, we might wonder why we should believe that we are justified in acting 
on our own judgment only in cases of first-hand knowledge. Why not also in cases in 
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which our knowledge depends on moral arguments and collection of information? Is it 
because only in the case of first-hand knowledge we can be sure that our views are indeed 
correct? This seems implausible. There are many obvious examples in which this is not 
the case. Indeed, one of the aims of the trial is precisely to test the often conflicting first-
hand knowledge of different testimonies. More importantly, even if we were to grant that 
first-hand knowledge always provides us with absolute certainty, we might wonder why 
we should place such an unusually strict constraint on our action. We normally think that 
we can justifiably act as we think is correct provided that we are certain enough about the 
correctness of our action. I cannot think of many circumstances in which full certainty is 
required, if only because I cannot think of many cases in which full certainty can be 
achieved.18 Thus, whatever reason motivates Estlund to concede that we don’t have a 
duty to comply with the outcomes of a democratic procedure when we have first-hand 
knowledge that the procedure has failed to identify the morally correct course of actions, 
is also a reason to concede that we don’t have a duty to comply when we are sure enough 
that it has so failed. This means that once the jailer has sufficient reasons to believe that 
the prisoner is innocent, she is permitted, indeed required, to disobey the order to keep 
him in prison (unless there are strong countervailing reasons). Similarly, when 
combatants have sufficient reason to believe that the war they are asked to fight is unjust, 
they don’t have a duty to obey. They are permitted, indeed required, to disobey even if 
this means violating the public acceptability requirement. 
Perhaps Estlund could avoid this problem by providing an explanation of why 
first-hand knowledge is special. Let us grant that he can do that. Would this be enough to 
rescue his position? I do not think so, for he makes a second important concession as to 
why orders coming from a democratic state which is duly investigating the justice of the 
war can nonetheless lack authority. “If an order to go to war … is not even close to what 
would be just if the facts were as the authority states them to be, or if the stated view of 
the justifying facts is not even close to a reasonable conclusion based on the appropriate 
materials, the soldier is not obligated (and probably not permitted) to carry out the order 
even if the procedure that produced the order meets the honest mistake standard” (p. 
230). 
This confirms that, at least in some occasions, the public acceptability 
requirement can be defeated by our duty to do what is morally right. Moreover, we might 
ask a similar question to the one considered in relation to the first concession made by 
Estlund: Why should we think that authoritative commands are no longer binding only in 
the case of particularly egregious mistakes, i.e. in the case of decisions that are “not even 
close” to the right ones? Why don’t these decisions also stop being binding in the case of 
less serious mistakes, provided that these mistakes are serious enough? If we are 
sufficiently sure that the war we are asked to fight is unjust, why should we obey simply 
                                                
18 Of course there are cases in which we should be particularly careful in trusting our judgment, but even in 
those cases once we are sufficiently sure about it we are normally allowed to act on it. 
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because the decision to fight it is not excessively unreasonable? Of course a problem with 
this suggestion is how to determine when we can be said to be sufficiently sure that the 
war we are asked to fight is unjust. I will not able to address this question here.19 My 
point, however, is that this is the question that we should address, rather than employ 
Estlund’s test. 
Most importantly, Estlund’s second concession seems to contradict his claim that 
combatants only need to check that jus in bello principles are respected and that a honest 
attempt has been made to find out about the justice of the cause. Remember that as long 
as combatants do that, for Estlund they need not worry about the justice of the war, 
because even when their killing wrongs innocent victims, the combatant doing the killing 
is not acting wrongly.20 It is the state, not its combatants, that is wronging the victims. 
Combatants’ participation is “sanitized” because they are merely following orders (as 
they should). 21 Estlund’s second concession, by contrast, suggests that when the decision 
to go to war is “not even close” to the reasonable one, combatants have no duty to obey, 
even if the procedure that produced the order meets the “honest mistake standard”. And 
Estlund acknowledges that it is perfectly possible that procedures which normally 
produce reasonable, if not perfectly correct, results will sometimes produce in good faith 
results that are not even close to the reasonable ones.  
Where does this leave us? The conclusions of this section are three. First, it is 
hard to see how the two concessions introduced by Estlund can be squared with his 
general account of the duty to obey the law, if not as ad hoc adjustments. Second, once 
we accept these two concessions (as I think we should), it is not clear why they should be 
limited in the way Estlund suggests. Why should we think that it’s permissible to 
disregard authoritative commands that would lead us to committing a serious injustice 
only provided that either we have first-hand knowledge that a serious injustice would 
follow or the outcome is so unjust that it’s “not even close” to a reasonable one. I have 
suggested that whatever reasons could be plausibly invoked by Estlund to introducing 
these two exceptions is also a reason to broaden the scope of the exceptions as follows: 
we are permitted to disregard authoritative commands provided that we are sufficiently 
sure that obeying would lead us to commit an injustice and the injustice is sufficiently 
serious. Third, taking seriously Estlund’s second concession requires giving up his claim 
that as long as combatants have verified that their state has made an “honest attempt” to 
respect jus ad bellum principles, they can disregard the question of whether these 
principles are in fact met.  
                                                
19 McMahan presents some convincing arguments to the effect that individuals can sometimes have a 
sufficient level of confidence to question the decisions made by the government (KIW, chs. 3. See 
Lefkowitz’s example).  
20 See above, p. 3. 
21 Estlund p. 213. In this respect Estlund’s idea is quite close to Walzer’s, that soldiers ought to be 
considered merely “human instruments” (p.36) in the hands of states (which in turn echoes Augustine’s 
claim that they are the “sword in the hand of him who uses it”). 
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But while the foregoing criticism gives us reasons to reject Estlund’s view, there 
is much to be learnt from his sophisticated attempt to formulate a “political argument” for 
the duty to obey the order to fight unjust wars. One idea in particular will be important 
for the view defended here, namely the thought that while membership in a legitimate 
state does give us special reasons to comply with its laws and commands, this does not 
give us a permission to fight any war we are asked to fight (contra Walzer). To begin 
with, whether or not the mistaken decisions to enter the war are the product of an “honest 
mistake”, i.e. whether the relevant political authority has tried to correctly assess the 
justice of the war, is relevant to establishing whether we have a duty to obey. Secondly, 
there will be cases in which the order to fight is so unjust that our duty will be to disobey, 
despite the fact that it comes from a legitimate political authority that is making an 
“honest mistake”. I have suggested that Estlund’s theory cannot provide a plausible basis 
for these claims. A convincing version of the “political argument” will have to do so. 
 
 
3) Cheyney Ryan and the “Argument to Democratic Duty” 
 
In this section I consider a second formulation of the “political argument”, namely the 
view defended by Cheyney Ryan in his “Democratic Duty and the Moral Dilemmas of 
Soldiers.” Although simpler in its structure, this view seems to me closer to the correct 
one than Estlund’s, and it is by building on the central insight of this view that I will 
develop my own position.  
Ryan claims that combatants are under an obligation to fight wars, even when 
unjust, because by doing so they sustain democratic institutions that perform important 
tasks, most notably the task of fighting wars that are generally just. Although Ryan calls 
this the “Argument to Democratic Duty”, democratic procedures do not play much of a 
role in it.22 His point seems to be rather that political institutions are necessary to protect 
our lives and the lives of our loved ones, as well as important moral values. Although 
these institutions will sometimes go wrong, they generally wage just wars (i.e. fight for 
just causes justly). The reason why we have a duty to obey even when we are 
commanded to fight an unjust war is that this is required in order to “protect our 
protectors” (as Hobbes puts it), i.e. in order to support the institutions that play such a 
fundamental role.23 
Ryan does make some generic assumptions about how the decision to go to war is 
generally made in democratic institutions (he mentions that these institutions are likely to 
fight only just wars), but he does not make the duty to fight conditional on whether the 
                                                
22  The point of calling this argument “democratic” is simply to exclude its application to unjust political 
institutions, such as the Nazi regime (Ryan, …). 
23 It’s worth noticing here that the “protective institutions” that Ryan is talking about are not simply 
military institutions, but also the broader political institutions of which military institutions are simply a 
component (p. 21). 
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decision was reasonable or on whether a mistake has been made honestly (p. 12), nor 
does he place any weight on anything like the Estlund’s public acceptability requirement. 
He simply rests his argument on a broader duty to support the state, given the crucial role 
that the state has in protecting its citizens. Thus, the main consequence of adopting 
Ryan’s view is that whereas for Estlund the existence of a duty to fight an unjust war will 
have to be established on a case by case basis (has the state made a genuine effort to find 
out whether the war is just? Is its final judgment not too unreasonable?), for Ryan the 
duty binds all citizens and establishes an obligation for them to fight just wars as well as 
unjust ones.24  
I think this argument points in the right direction, but the obvious reply to it is that 
even if we grant the existence of a duty to fight when required to by our state, this surely 
must be a prima facie duty – one that can be overridden, at least in some circumstances, 
by our duty not to kill innocents. Thus, while something like Ryan’s argument can 
ground a duty to fight an unjust war, we should certainly expect the duty to be 
overridden, at least some times, by our duty not to kill innocents.  
This however, is a move that Ryan, like Estlund, wants to resist. And 
interestingly, like Estlund, he resorts to a parallel with the criminal justice system. He 
writes: “suppose that the institution of capital punishment, like a democracy’s protective 
institutions, is necessary to protecting oneself and one’s loved ones. Suppose that one’s 
refusal (as executioner) to execute an innocent person would jeopardize the entire 
institution in ways that render oneself and one’s loved ones vulnerable to unjust attack. 
Suppose for example that you know that if you fail to execute the innocent person, you 
and your loved ones will be set upon by a band of criminal marauders, who are no longer 
deterred by the threat of capital punishment. At the very least, there is a real dilemma 
here.” (pp. 20-1).The suggestion of course is that disobeying the order to fight an unjust 
war would have similar catastrophic consequences.  
I find this argument implausible.25 Notice, to begin with, that even if it was 
plausible, McMahan could reply that only when these catastrophic consequences are 
likely to happen, should combatants obey the order to fight an unjust war. Whenever they 
have reason to believe that no similar consequences would follow, they could permissibly 
disobey. Indeed, they would have a duty to do so. The only way for Ryan to resist this 
view is to argue that each and every case of disobedience is likely to produce these 
catastrophic consequences, but surely this cannot be right. It is never the case that 
                                                
24 Ryan explicitly rejects as irrelevant Estlund’s idea that the existence of a duty to fight depends on 
whether the state has made an honest attempt to find out about the justice of the war. This seems too strong. 
Certainly whether my state is trying to establish the justice of a war must make a difference as to my duty 
to fight it. It is hard to believe that a state that normally does (or tries to do) a good job in choosing which 
wars to fight, thereby has a right to obedience even when it decides to openly disregard the question of the 
justice of the war it wages. 
25 Incidentally, it’s curious to see the best known reductio of consequentialism (namely, the idea that 
sometimes punishing the innocent would produce the best consequences) here used as an argument against 
McMahan’s view. 
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isolated cases of disobedience jeopardize the existence of the state. Indeed, as many have 
noticed, even generalized disobedience does not compromise the state’s existence or it 
capacity to perform its tasks.26  
The problem here is that Ryan, like McMahan, operates with what we might call a 
“teleological understanding” of the duty to obey the law – one that grounds such duty in 
the fact that disobedience is likely to undermine the ability of political institutions to 
provide those benefits that justify their existence.27 However, this is not how we should 
think about the justification for our duty to obey the law. Although the justification for 
political authority and political obligation ultimately does depend on the fact that states 
provide us with fundamentally important benefits, our duty to obey the law does not 
hinge on the question of whether disobedience would compromise their capacity to do so, 
but rather on the fact that when states commands us to act in certain ways they create for 
us a prima facie obligation to act as commanded.  
To see this point, consider the practice of promising. While it is plausible to 
suggest that the justification of promising ultimately relies on the fact that we benefit 
from being able to create special bonds with other people, this is not to say that our duty 
to keep promises is conditional on the fact that doing so is required not to threaten the 
existence of the practice that secures this benefit. Our duty to keep promises rather 
depends on the fact that when we promise to φ we thereby create new special moral 
reasons for us to φ, reasons that we did not have before promising. If you fail to keep 
your next promise, the existence of the practice of promising will not be endangered in 
any way (it is only if a significant number of people failed to keep their promises that this 
risk would exist), and yet it seems uncontroversial that you do have a prima facie duty to 
keep your promise. That duty might be overridden, but cannot be ignored.28 
The duty to obey the law of legitimate states is to be conceived along the same 
lines. As long as states have legitimate authority,29 even a relatively high level of 
disobedience does not compromise their capacity to perform their crucial functions. And 
yet, when a legitimate state requires that we φ, it places us under a prima facie duty to 
φ.30 This is how political authority is normally conceived. Of course, this is not to yet say 
that we are right in conceiving it in this way. What we need to do now is explain why 
states have legitimate authority and what it means to say that the duty is “prima facie”. 
This is the task to which I turn in the next section, in order to develop my own version of 
the “political argument”.  
 
 
 
                                                
26 Simmons, Moral Principles, 1979; Green;  
27 KIW pp. 71, 75 
28 Green, The Authority of the State, p. 252 
29 A state has legitimacy if it has political authority – add footnote 
30 Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy, p.  
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4) The “moral alchemy” objection 
 
I think that Ryan is right both in grounding the duty to fight unjust wars in our 
membership in the state and in grounding membership in the state in the fact that states 
provide us with vitally important benefits, most notably security and the rule of law. 
Where he goes wrong is in overstating the weight of the obligation to obey the state. This 
obligation, like all the duties imposed by the state, is only prima facie. This means that it 
will have to be balanced with other obligations that we have. Thus, when a legitimate 
state commands its citizens to fight, they do acquire a prima facie moral obligation to do 
so. The fact that they are so commanded does create a moral obligation for them to fight. 
But when the war is unjust this obligation will be typically overridden by their obligation 
not to contribute to the killing of innocents. In other words, whilst Ryan is right in 
claiming that our membership in a legitimate state does make a difference with respect to 
our duty to fight an unjust war, such membership makes less of a difference than he 
suggests.  
Consider again the case of promises. What happens when I break my promise to 
meet you for lunch in order to take someone injured to the hospital? The standard 
analysis of this case is that while the duty to keep my promise is overridden by a 
weightier duty, it still maintains its original force. And yet we have seen that by failing to 
keep my promise I do not jeopardize in any way the institution of promising. The 
capacity of this institution to perform its valuable functions is in no way compromised by 
the fact that our duty to keep our promises is sometimes justifiably overridden by other 
duties we have. 
Are the duties imposed by the law special in this sense? They don’t seem to be. 
While I am driving the injured person to the hospital I can permissibly disrespect the 
speed limit or the traffic light to increase the chances of saving her. These are cases that 
no one finds mysterious. None of those who agree that we have a duty to obey the law are 
likely to suggest that breaking the law in this instance would threaten ability of the state 
to perform its functions. So, why should there be a special problem when the same 
argument is applied to the duty to obey the order to fight? The answer is that indeed there 
is no special problem. The two cases should be treated in the same way. Just like I have 
some moral reasons to respect the traffic light, but these reasons can be overridden when 
I have stronger reasons to ignore it (as it is the case when ignoring the traffic light would 
reduce the chances of saving someone’s life),31 I have some reasons to obey the order to 
                                                
31 Of course ignoring the traffic light does not mean that I don’t have a duty to stop. It only means that I 
don’t have a duty to stop simply because the traffic light is red. I do have a duty to stop if driving through 
would create a significant risk of accidents with other vehicles. However, that duty is not one created by the 
state. 
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fight, but these reasons can be overridden when I have stronger reasons to disobey (as it 
is the case when obeying would be contributing to the killing of innocents).32 
This view provides an elegant and intuitively straightforward formulation of the 
“political argument”, but is subject to the following powerful objection: how could the 
fact that a state commands me to fight an unjust war give me any reason to fight? 
Fighting an unjust war typically involves killing innocents, and killing innocents is 
clearly wrong – indeed, it is the paradigmatic case of malum in se. How could the fact 
that the state requires us to commit something wrong give us any reason, even prima 
facie, to do so? This view, McMahan argues, “presupposes a form of moral alchemy that 
is difficult to accept. How can certain people’s establishment of political relations among 
themselves confer on them a right to harm or kill others, when the harming or killing 
would be impermissible in the absence of the relevant relations?”33 
The answer to this question is that the political relations that McMahan refers to are 
necessary in order for individuals to live together peacefully and to respect each other’s 
rights; for the justification of political authority, as Ryan notices, is grounded in certain 
important moral tasks that legitimate states perform. By performing their legislative, 
executive and judicial functions, legitimate states provide the level of order and 
coordination that is required for	   a	  minimally	   secure	   life;	  but states can perform these 
crucial moral tasks only if they have the power to impose genuine moral obligations on 
their subjects. Indeed, this is not so much a condition of their ability to perform the tasks 
above, but it is how they perform them. Some of the main problems that states are 
supposed to solve are coordination problems and problems relating to giving a clear 
content to rights and duties that would be otherwise indeterminate. The way in which 
states do that is by: a) altering the balance of reasons that apply to their subjects by 
imposing moral obligations on them (as it is sometimes put, the commands of the state 
provide their subjects with new content-independent reasons for action); b) backing their 
commands by a threat to use force to compel compliance. 
I defend this view at length elsewhere,34 but the details are not important here. In 
order to answer the “moral alchemy” objection we only need to grasp its rationale, which 
can be summarized as follows: states have authority over us to the extent that they enable 
us to discharge some of our most important duties of justice.35 One of our most important 
duties is the duty not to expose those living next to us to the dangers typical of the state 
of nature – dangers that are principally created by coordination and assurance problems, 
lack of enforcement, and indeterminacy of the content of rights. We can discharge this 
duty only if we are subject to the authority of the state, i.e. only if we take the commands 
                                                
32 Below I suggest a stronger formulation of this thesis. The laws of a legitimate state give us not only some 
reasons to act as we are required, but presumptive reasons to do so. See below, pp 21-2. 
33 KIW, p. 82. 
34 Renzo, “State Legitimacy and Self-Defence”, Law and Philosophy, 30, 5, 2011 pp. xx. 
35 This approach to the problem of political authority is defended by Anna Stiltz (Liberal Loyalty), Tom 
Christiano (The Constitution of Equality) and Kit Wellman (Is there a Duty to Obey the Law?), among 
others, although each of these authors articulates it in different ways. 
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of the state as providing us with content-independent reasons for action.36 This is why 
when the state commands us to φ we thereby acquire a moral obligation (i.e. new content-
independent moral reasons) to φ. 	  
But as we know, states unfortunately are not perfect. All states will make mistakes 
and require us to sometimes act unjustly. The crucial point, however, is that legitimate 
states will make mistakes (or at least, serious mistakes) in good faith – i.e. they will try to 
pass, and normally succeed in passing, laws that enable their citizens to act as they should 
(or at least as they are morally permitted to). You might think that there is a long list of 
profoundly unjust states that work as counterexamples to this characterization, but notice 
that I have been talking of legitimate states. And a necessary condition that states need to 
meet to be legitimate is that of being reasonably just. States that are not reasonably just 
cannot enjoy legitimacy precisely because the point of political authority is to enable 
individuals to discharge some of their most important duties of justice.	  
It is commonly accepted that only legitimate states can impose morally binding 
obligations on their subjects. However, it is also commonly accepted that unjust 
commands of a legitimate state do bind – i.e. they do create a prima facie obligation for 
us to obey, in the same way in which just commands do. 37 For if only just commands did 
bind, the existence of the authority would make no normative difference whatsoever. The 
state would have no genuine normative power in that its directives would be binding only 
to the extent that they command us to do what we already have reason to do. If so, the 
authority would be redundant and would perform at most an epistemic (or evidentiary) 
function.38 But states can only perform their crucially important functions if they have 
such normative powers. A state having merely an epistemic (or evidentiary) function 
could not do that.39 
To be sure, legitimate states do not have the power to impose on their citizens an 
obligation to do anything they like, for there are things that clearly fall outside the scope 
of their authority. For example, they do not have the power to decide which religion we 
should practice or whom we should marry. But within the scope of their authority, states 
are allowed to make mistakes without thereby losing their capacity to impose prima facie 
obligations; and deciding when to resort to military force certainly does fall within the 
scope of state authority. 
To better see this point, consider the authority that doctors normally have over the 
nurses in their ward. By virtue of this authority, doctors do place nurses under a prima 
facie moral obligation to act as they require, but this is not to say that doctors can direct 
                                                
36 Wellman’s approach is particularly close to the one I defend in my own work, but there are important 
differences between our views. The main one is that my view grounds the duty to obey the law in a 
negative duty not to expose those living next to us to the dangers of the state of nature, whereas Wellman 
grounds the duty in a positive duty to rescue them from these dangers. 
37 See, for example, Raz The Morality of Freedom, pp. 47-8, 61 and Schauer, p. 5. As far as I know, 
Christopher Wellman is the only one to reject this view (2005, pp. 81-4). 
38 For a classic formulation of this objection see Robert Paul Wolff, In Defence of Anarchism. 
39 Raz 
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nurses to do anything they want. For example, a doctor could not place a nurse under a 
prima facie moral obligation to sing for her, as this would clearly fall outside the scope of 
the doctor’s authority. For the same reason, a doctor could not place a nurse under a 
prima facie moral obligation to intentionally kill a patient.40 But here’s a complication: a 
doctor who is genuinely trying to save a patient’s life can place a nurse under a prima 
facie moral obligation to give the patient a certain pill, even if the pill then turns out to 
kill the patient. For it falls within the scope of the doctor’s authority to place nurses under 
an obligation to do what doctors reasonably believe to be in the interest of their patients.  
This might sound odd. Shouldn’t we rather say that nurses acquire reasons to act as 
directed only after they have verified that what they are required to do is indeed in the 
interest of the patient? No, because if that was the case, nurses could not be said to be 
under the doctor’s authority. The doctor’s directives would have at most an epistemic 
function: instead of providing nurses with practical reasons, they would simply indicate 
that there is reason to believe that, say, giving a certain pill to the patient is the right 
course of action. But a hospital in which nurses take doctors’ decisions as mere advice, 
rather than authoritative directives, is one in which we would not want to end up. For the 
efficiency of a hospital largely depends on the capacity of doctors to rely on the fact that 
their directives will be taken as authoritative. 
Notice that none of this is supposed to suggest that authoritative directives can never 
be questioned. A nurse who has good reason to believe that a certain pill will kill the 
patient certainly has an all-things-considered duty not to give it to him (more on this 
below). My point here is that this duty overrides an existing prima-facie duty that she has 
to act as required by the doctor – a prima facie duty that is created by the exercise of the 
doctor’s legitimate authority, even when the doctor makes a mistake.  
This dynamic, and its application to the question of the duty to obey the order to fight, 
will be further explored in the next section. For now, the point that should be stressed is 
this: McMahan is certainly right that when state A unjustly attacks state B, the citizens of 
B cannot become liable to being killed simply in virtue of the special political relations 
existing among the members of A. However, these relationships can nonetheless create 
some normative reasons for A’s citizens to fight, reasons which will then have to be 
weighed against the rights of B’s citizens not to be killed. Although the reason created by 
the order of a legitimate political authority cannot affect what rights other people have, it 
can weigh against those rights (just as a lesser-evil justification or a role-based 
professional duty can).41  
 
 
 
                                                
40 Here I am assuming that the patient does not want to die.  
41 Interestingly, McMahan concedes that soldiers’ professional duties can create special reasons to act and 
that these reasons will have to be weighed against the reasons not to fight in a war that is objectively unjust 
(KIW, p. 72). 
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5) The presumptive nature of the duty to obey 
 
The aim of the previous section was to explain what produces the “moral alchemy” that 
gives legitimate states the moral power to place their subjects under a prima facie 
obligation to act in ways that would otherwise be morally impermissible, provided that 
they are acting in good faith. I have done this in two steps. First, I have suggested that the 
reason why legitimate states have the power to impose genuine moral obligations on us is 
that being under the authority of legitimate states is the only way in which we can 
discharge our duty not to expose those living next to us to the dangers of the state of 
nature. Second, I have argued that whilst only legitimate states impose moral obligations 
on us, they do so even when they require us to do something unjust, provided that they 
are acting within the scope of their authority. For if the law was binding only when it 
directs us to do what we already have reason to do, the law would be redundant and 
perform at most an epistemic function, and this would not be enough for states to be able 
to perform the crucially important tasks that justify their existence. 
Thus, the moral alchemy that gives political authorities the moral power to 
impose on us a prima facie obligation to fight an unjust war is the moral alchemy that 
gives them the moral power to impose on us a prima facie obligation to do anything. 
Under the assumption that the state is legitimate, its command to fight an unjust war does 
not work any differently from any other command – the command to pay our taxes, to 
respect the speed limit or to stop at traffic light.42 But we have seen that a state is 
legitimate only if it is reasonably just. And surely a state is not reasonably just if it 
decides to fight unjust wars, which typically involve the killing of civilians. A reasonably 
just state will require that we fight an unjust war only when, in Estlund’s words, it’s 
making an “honest mistake”.  
In other words, there is a matter of the fact as to whether my state is legitimate or 
not. This will depend, among other things, on whether the state is reasonably just. If the 
state is not reasonably just (and therefore is illegitimate), I have no prima facie duty to 
obey any of its laws or commands – including, of course, its command to fight an unjust 
war. I might have a duty to conform to some of them to the extent that I have independent 
moral reasons to act as they require, but not a duty to obey.43 If the state is reasonably just 
and the war I am required to fight is unjust, I have a prima facie obligation to obey, but 
this obligation will be typically overridden by the independent moral duty I have not to 
contribute to the killing of innocents. For, although the duty to obey the law is a weighty 
                                                
42 Here I assume that it falls within the scope of the authority of states to decide when resort to war is 
justified (in the same way in which it falls within the scope of the authority of doctors to decide when 
certain medicines should be administered to their patients). As far as I know, this assumption is largely 
uncontroversial. 
43 This is what explains why, for example, German citizens had a duty to respect traffic laws or tort law 
under the Nazi regime. On the distinction between obeying the law and conforming to it, see Raz. 
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one, the negative duty not to kill innocent is likely to be weightier in most normal 
contexts. (More on this below.) 
The further point I would like to make now is that we do have a duty to find out: 
a) whether our state is illegitimate; b) whether the legitimate state to which we belong is 
requiring us to act unjustly. This is because while states normally do a lot of good, they 
can also do a lot of harm. Illegitimate states, where their illegitimacy depends on the fact 
that they pursue unjust causes such as fighting unjust wars, typically do a lot of harm; and 
we have a duty to make sure that we are not accomplices in this harm. But as we have 
seen, legitimate states can also occasionally be responsible for causing unjust harm, 
although acting with the best intentions; and we also have a duty to make sure that we are 
not accomplices in this harm.  
Of course there are different kinds of harm that a legitimate state can perpetrate. 
Unnecessary taxes, forms of discrimination, unjust trade policies are obvious examples. 
Even something as trivial as an unnecessary traffic light constitutes in a sense a form of 
harm, as it sets back our interests by constraining our liberty for no good reason. This last 
sort of injustice however, is one that we should not care too much about, given how 
insignificant it is in comparison to the crucially important functions that states perform. 
On the other end of the spectrum is the injustice that states perpetrate when they fight 
unjust wars, since this involves the killing of innocents. This injustice is so serious that 
we have a duty to do all we can to verify that we are not accomplices in it.  
This suggests that, in line with McMahan’s view, individuals must indeed take 
responsibility for their actions, but (contra McMahan) in doing so they should also 
acknowledge that to the extent that they are acting as members of a legitimate state, 
special normative reasons apply to them. These reasons should be factored in into their 
deliberation. The crucial question now is to explain how these reasons operate in their 
deliberation.  
Following an idea articulated independently by Tony Honoré and Frederick 
Schauer, I will suggest that political obligation gives us “presumptive reasons” to obey 
the law. This means that when the political authority requires that we φ we do not merely 
acquire new moral reasons to φ, reasons that we did not have before the directive was 
issued. By requiring us to φ the political authority creates something stronger, i.e. a 
presumption that our all-things-considered duty is to φ. This means that unless 
particularly strong countervailing reasons are available, we should act on the assumption 
that our all-things-considered duty is to φ. However, there will be cases in which strong 
countervailing reasons are indeed available, and in these cases we need to be alert and be 
ready to reassess what our all-things-considered duty is. Depending on the circumstances, 
it might be that our all things considered duty is to not-φ. 
Thus, the existence of a prima facie duty to obey the law does make a significant 
difference as to what we ought to do. The existence of this duty, as suggested by Honoré, 
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shifts the burden of proof:44 absent the duty, I would have no reason to drive at no more 
than 20 miles per hour in Oxford’s city center, unless I can think of good reasons to drive 
so slow (perhaps I am aware that I am not a good driver, or tonight it’s particularly 
foggy). Whereas once the duty is in place, I have moral reasons to drive at no more than 
20 miles per hour, unless I can think of good reasons why I should drive faster (as in the 
case when I am taking someone to the hospital). 
This is not the place for an extensive defence of the model of “presumptive reasons”. 
Its main virtue, however, is that it provides an intuitively convincing account of the 
special force of authoritative directives, while avoiding at the same time a number of 
problems that afflict its main competitor, namely Raz’s model of “exclusionary 
reasons”.45 To see this, consider again the case of the directives issued by doctors to 
nurses. We have seen that if nurses were to always verify whether what doctors ask them 
to do is indeed in the interest of the patients, hospitals’ efficiency would be severely 
compromised, as such efficiency largely depends precisely on the capacity of doctors to 
rely on the fact that their directives will not be constantly re-assessed. For this reason, 
nurses should normally act on the assumption that their all-things-considered duty is to 
act as directed. However, the model of presumptive reasons can account for the fact that 
when nurses have sufficient reasons to believe that what they are asked to do will 
severely harm the patients (for example, when they are confident that the doctor has 
failed to pay sufficient attention to an allergy of the patient) their all-things-considered 
duty is to disobey.  
The model of exclusionary reason, by contrast, cannot account for the fact that 
disobedience is justified in this case. For according to this model, authoritative directives 
in addition to giving us reasons to act as required, also give us reasons to refrain from 
acting on competing reasons. More precisely, as long as the directives fall within the 
scope of the authority, the reasons provided by them will exclude any “underlying 
reasons” (i.e. any reasons that the authority had the power to consider in issuing the 
directives) from being balanced against them.46 In our example, as long as doctors’ 
directives fall within the scope of their authority, the reasons provided to nurses by them 
                                                
44 This is in line with the primary legal usage of the term “prima facie”, which denotes the amount of 
evidence necessary to establish the case of the plaintiff (or of the prosecution). If the plaintiff or the 
prosecution have brought evidence that amounts to a prima facie case, then the defendant will prevail only 
if she overcomes that evidence (or presents a defense); Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules, 1991, p. 
114.  
45 See for example, Chaim Gans, “Mandatory Rules and Exclusionary Reasons,”  Philosophia 15 (1986) 
373; Michael S. Moore, “Authority, Law, and Razian Reasons,” Southern California Law Review 62 (1989) 
827; Stephen R. Perry, “Second-Order Reasons, Uncertainty and Legal Theory,” Southern California Law 
Review 62 (1989) 913; Donald H. Regan, “Authority and Value: Reflections on Raz’s Morality of 
Freedom,”  Southern California Law Review 62 (1989) 995; Larry Alexander, “Law and Exclusionary 
Reasons,”  Philosophical Topics 18 (1990) 5, 8–9; Fredrick Schauer,  Playing by the Rules (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1991), 88–93.  
46 [Find example about soldier commanded to move track in MoF] Extensive discussions of this objection 
can be found in Fredrick Schauer,  Playing by the Rules, esp. pp. 88–93; Noam Gur “Legal Directives in 
the Realm of Practical Reasons”, American Journal of Jurisprudence. 
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will exclude any “underlying reasons” (i.e. any reasons that doctors had the power to 
consider in issuing the directives) from being balanced against them. 
If we believe that in cases such as the one just described, the reasons provided by the 
authority can be occasionally overridden by their underlying reasons (at least when the 
latter are particularly compelling), we should abandon the model of exclusionary reason 
in favour of the model of presumptive reasons. And once we adopt the latter, we should 
analyze the question of the duty to obey the order to fight as follows: when citizens of 
legitimate states are required to fight a war, they acquire a prima facie moral obligation to 
obey. Having this obligation is something more than simply having some moral reasons 
to fight. Citizens now have a presumptive duty to fight. However, this presumption can 
be rebutted if they have a stronger duty not to fight. Since fighting unjust wars involves 
killing innocent persons, the presumption is likely to be overridden in this case.47 
Two clarifications are now in order. Firstly, it is worth stressing that “presumptive 
reasons” are normative reasons and not epistemic reasons. The point is not that since the 
authority is more likely to individuate morally correct courses of actions, once the 
authority requires that we φ, we thereby acquire presumptive reasons to believe that φ is 
what we have a duty to do (reasons which can be then overridden if we have access to 
other epistemic reasons that rebut this presumption). As we have seen, political 
authorities cannot perform their functions by providing us with epistemic reasons (i.e. 
reasons to believe), but only by creating normative reasons (i.e. new moral reasons for 
action). To say that these reasons are presumptive is to say that their normative force is 
such as to shift the burden of proof: once the authority requires that we φ, φ-ing becomes 
the default mandatory conduct. Our normative situation drastically changes because 
while before the order was issued we were at liberty of not φ-ing, unless special reasons 
to φ arised, we are not under a duty to φ, unless special reasons to non-φ arise. In other 
words, when the authority requires that we φ, all things being equals our all-things- 
considered duty is to φ. But things are not always equal, and when they are not, we must 
be ready to reconsider what our duty is. 
Secondly, I want to stress an important difference between the way in which 
Schauer and I characterize this presumption. According to Schauer, we should routinely 
obey the law while keeping an eye open to verify that our duty to obey is not being 
overridden.  What he offers is “the idea of a casual look, a glimpse, a peek, a preliminary 
check, pursuant to which a decisionmaker follows the recognized rule unless some other 
factor overtly intrudes on her decisionmaking process. Implicit in [this view] is a 
phenomenology such that the decisionmaker is open to the possibility of the presumption 
                                                
47 I leave aside here complications related to the fact that segments of an unjust war can be just, and thus we 
might have a duty to fight those sections of the war. These complications do not affect the thrust of my 
view, although they will call for more complex assessments of what our all-things-considered duty is. For 
example, after having established that my state is pursuing an unjust cause and that, therefore, the 
presumption in favour of obeying the order to fight has been rebutted, I might realize that there are reasons 
to fight a segment of it. 
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being overcome, but does not actively pursue it, or can do a quick check short of a 
thorough inquiry”.48  
While broadly in agreement with this view, I contend that it should be amended as 
follows: In those areas of decision making in which we have reason to believe that: a) the 
authority is particularly likely to make mistakes; and b) these mistakes would lead to the 
perpetrations of serious injustice; something more than a “glimpse” or a quick check is in 
order. When these two conditions are met, we have a duty to actively investigate whether 
there are any countervailing reasons strong enough to justify disobedience. Indeed, the 
amount of scrutiny that should be devoted to assess the justification of disobedience is 
directly proportional to the likelihood of mistakes being made by the authority and the 
seriousness of the injustice that would follow. 
This is why above I have suggested that we have a duty to do all we can to assess 
the justice of any war we are asked to fight. For a) there are good reasons to believe that 
states are often prone to mistakes in assessing the justice of their cause (mainly because 
in making these assessments they are often biased in favour of their own interests),49 and 
b) when unjust wars are waged, profound injustices are bound to be perpetrated (to the 
extent that they involve the killing of innocents). It might be objected here that requiring 
that we do all we can to assess the justice of the war we are asked to fight is too 
demanding. But this is one of those cases in which we should expect morality to be 
demanding. Given a) and b), our duty to make sure that we are not fighting an unjust war 
is certainly one of the strongest we have as moral agents. 
 
 
6) An Objection 
 
Before concluding, I must consider an objection that might be moved to the view I have 
outlined. I’ve repeatedly stressed that typically our duty not to contribute to the killing of 
innocents will override our duty to obey the order to fight an unjust war. To this it might 
be objected that if the state gives us genuine normative reasons to fight, surely there must 
be some conceivable case in which these reasons will tip the balance in favour of fighting 
an unjust war. If so, my view seems unacceptable: How could the duty to obey the law 
ever override the duty not to contribute to the killing of innocents? If, on the other hand, 
there is no conceivable case in which the former overrides the latter, then my view seems 
to be ultimately no different from McMahan’s. 
 The first horn of the dilemma can be easily dealt with: there is nothing incoherent 
in saying that the duty not to contribute to the killing of innocents always overrides the 
duty to obey the law. Most of the obligations we can imagine to incur, after all, are 
similar to the duty to obey the law in this respect. Nurses’ duty to obey doctors is always 
                                                
48 Schauer, “Rules and the Rule of Law”, 677 
49 See the arguments by McMahan… 
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overridden by their duty not to administer medications that will kill the patients; the duty 
to return things I borrowed from you is always overridden by my duty not provide you 
with deadly weapons (so if I know that you are planning to use the baseball bat I’m about 
to return you to assault someone my all-things-considered duty is not to do so); the 
contractual duty of a demolition company’s employee to blow a building is always 
overridden by the duty not to kill occupants who refuse to move. The fact that the duty to 
obey the doctors, to return borrowed items, or to fulfill contractual obligations is 
regularly overridden by the duty not to contribute to the killing of innocents does not cast 
any doubts on the existence of these duties. Why should it cast any doubts on the 
existence of a duty to obey the law of a legitimate state? 
But what is the point of stressing the existence of the duty to obey the law in the 
context of just war theory, we might ask, if this duty is always overridden? Why not 
simply say that we always have duty not to fight unjust wars, as McMahan does? One 
reason, of course, is philosophical accuracy. One of the things we are interested in, as 
philosophers, is having an account of the morality of war that provides an accurate 
picture of the different moral reasons at stake in the decision to fight. Since McMahan’s 
view does not account for the fact that receiving the order to fight an unjust war by a 
legitimate state (acting in good faith) does give us some reasons to fight, and that these 
reasons will then have to be weighed against the reasons that we have not to fight, we 
should reject his view in favour of one that correctly represent all the reasons at stake. 
 This, however, is not the only reason to adopt my view. Although McMahan’s theory 
and the one I am suggesting do not offer different answers to the question of when we 
have an all-things-considered duty not to fight, they offer very different answers to the 
question of how we should deliberate about whether we have a duty to fight, and 
therefore also to the question of when we can be blamed for taking part in unjust wars. As 
to the question of deliberation, whereas according to McMahan, we should presume that 
our duty is not to fight unless we gather enough evidence in support of the conclusion 
that the war is just,50 according to my view when a legitimate state orders us to fight we 
should presume that our duty is to fight unless we gather enough evidence in support of 
the conclusion that the war is unjust. Just like nurses should disobey doctors’ directive 
only when they are sufficiently sure that otherwise they would seriously harm the patient, 
citizens should disobey the order to fight of a legitimate state only when they are 
sufficiently sure that the war they are asked to fight is unjust. If combatants are unable to 
reach a sufficient level of certainty, they should assume that their obligation is to fight.51 
This is because when we move from the question of what we have most reasons to do 
given the way things are (i.e. what is right “in the fact relative sense”) to the question of 
how we should act given the evidence available to us (i.e. what is right in the “evidence 
                                                
50 See above, p. 2  
51 [Check whether McMahan formulates his view in terms of belief-relative wrongfulness or in terms of 
evidence-relative wrongfulness.] 
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relative sense”),52 inevitably epistemic considerations enter into the picture. Obeying the 
order to fight a war is wrong in the fact-relative sense if the normative reasons that we 
have not to fight (grounded in the duty not to kill innocents) override the normative 
reasons we have to fight (grounded in our duty to obey the law); but it’s wrong in the 
evidence-relative sense only if, given the evidence available to us, we ought to believe 
that the normative reasons we have not to fight do indeed override the normative reasons 
we have to fight.  
As we have seen, McMahan and I give very different answers to the question of when 
we should believe that we have such reasons. This is of crucial importance for the further 
question of when citizens can be blamed for fighting an unjust war. In blaming someone 
we should not be looking at whether what she did was wrong in the fact-relative sense, 
but rather at whether it was wrong in the evidence-relative sense. For we should not 
blame someone for doing what, given the evidence available to her, she had reason to 
believe was not wrong. At the very least, the agent will be excused in this case. Now, 
given that McMahan’s view and mine offer different answers to the question of when 
obeying the order to fight would be unjust in the evidence-relative sense, they also offer 
different answers to the question of when citizens can be blamed for accepting to fight. 
According to McMahan, citizens are blameworthy if they fight when there isn’t sufficient 
evidence in support of the conclusion that the war is just. According to my view, they are 
only blameworthy if they fight when there is sufficient evidence that the war is unjust. As 
long as they do all they can to investigate the justice of the war, they are not blameworthy 
for fighting while lacking sufficient evidence that the war is just. In other words, although 
it’s always wrong to fight an unjust war, we cannot be blamed for fighting if we did all 
we could to figure out whether it was unjust. 
 
 
6) Conclusion 
 
In this paper I have offered a new version of the “political argument for the right to 
fight.” I have suggested that legitimate states preform crucially important functions, 
which are necessary in order to avoid the dangers typical of the state of nature. However, 
states can perform these functions only if they have the moral power to impose prima 
facie moral obligations on their subjects, a power that does not disappear when states 
make honest mistakes. A prima facie obligation is always defeasible, but it does create a 
presumption that our all things considered duty is to act as required. This is why when a 
legitimate state commands us to fight, we are in very different position from the one 
described by McMahan. According to McMahan, we should presume that our duty is not 
to fight unless we are sufficiently sure that the war is just; whereas according to the view 
                                                
52 For the distinction between the “fact-relative” and the “evidence-relative” sense of right and wrong, see 
Parfit, On What Matters, p.  
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defended here, when a legitimate state commands us to fight we should presume that our 
duty is to fight unless we are sufficiently sure that the war is unjust.  
However, my view sides with McMahan in arguing that we do have a duty to 
investigate whether the war we are asked to fight is unjust (contra Walzer and Estlund). 
Our duty is not only to disobey if we have sufficient reasons to believe that the war we 
are asked to fight is unjust, but also to do all we can to find out whether the war is unjust. 
Acknowledging the role played by political obligation in the moral deliberation of 
citizens commits us to the view that they have presumptive reasons to act as ordered; it 
does not commit us to the view that they should never question the order they receive. 
Reasonable just states are not immune from making mistakes, and in the case of war, 
these mistakes will normally take the form of serious injustices, as they will involve the 
killing of innocents. We do have a duty to make sure that we don’t play a role in these 
injustices.  
This view accounts for the two desiderata spelled out at the outset: it is sensitive to an 
important dimension of our practical life, namely the obligations that we have qua 
members of legitimate states, while acknowledging at the same time that the justice of the 
cause also makes a difference as to whether we can permissibly fight. As such, it avoids 
the main weaknesses of the positions defended by Walzer and McMahan. In addition, the 
view provides an account of the two insights identified by Estlund: it explains why we 
are under a prima facie duty to obey the order to fight an unjust war only when the 
decisions to enter the war is the product of an “honest mistake” (a state that intentionally 
wages unjust wars would lose its legitimacy thereby losing the power to impose any 
moral obligation on its subjects); and it also explains why there are cases in which our 
all-things-considered duty is to disobey, despite the fact that the order to fight comes 
from a legitimate political authority that is making a “honest mistake.” In light of this, I 
contend that the view defended here provides a promising framework within which to 
think about the morality of war. 
 
